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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/972,076	10/05/2001	Gregory A. Johnson	35006-629001US	4558
76615 7590 05/27/2010 MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C			EXAMINER	
ONE FINANCIAL CENTER BOSTON, MA 02111		RUTTEN, JAMES D		
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
		2192		
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			05/27/2010	PAPER

## Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
09/972,076	JOHNSON ET AL.		
Examiner	Art Unit		
JAMES RUTTEN	2192		

	JAMES RUTTEN	2192				
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the o	correspondence add	ress			
THE REPLY FILED 12 May 2010 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APP	LICATION IN CONDITION FOR AL	LOWANCE.				
1. \(\times\) The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appe for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C pendos;	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi eal (with appeal fee) in compliance FR 1.114. The reply must be filed	t, or other evidence, w with 37 CFR 41.31; or	vhich places the r (3) a Request			
a) The period for reply expiresmonths from the mailing b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire Is Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(	dvisory Action, or (2) the date set forth ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	date of the final rejection	on.			
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date have been filled is the date for purposes of determining the period of ext under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earmed patient term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL.	ension and the corresponding amount hortened statutory period for reply origi than three months after the mailing dat	of the fee. The appropria nally set in the final Office	ate extension fee e action; or (2) as			
<ol> <li>The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed w</li> </ol>	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the				
AMENDMENTS						
<ol> <li>∑ The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, I.         <ul> <li>(a)∑ They raise new issues that would require further cor</li> <li>(b) ☐ They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE belo</li> <li>(c) ☒ They are not deemed to place the application in bet appeal; and/or</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	nsideration and/or search (see NOT w);	ΓE below);				
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a c NOTE: See Continuation Sheet, (See 37 CFR 1.1		ected claims.				
The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12       Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):     Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all	21. See attached Notice of Non-Co		,			
non-allowable claim(s), 7.		l be entered and an e	xplanation of			
Claim(s) rejected: <u>84-106</u> . Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:						
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE  8. The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, bu because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).						
The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary.	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appear and was not earlier presented. Se	al and/or appellant fail se 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1	s to provide a ).			
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER</li> </ol>	n of the status of the claims after er	ntry is below or attach	ed.			
<ol> <li>The request for reconsideration has been considered bu <u>See Continuation Sheet.</u></li> </ol>	t does NOT place the application in	condition for allowan	ce because:			
12. ☐ Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i> (s). (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s) 13. ☐ Other:						
	/J. Derek Rutten/ Primary Examiner, Art U	nit 2192				

Continuation of 3. NOTE: The amendments of claims 84 and 105 change the scope of the claims and would require further consideration and/or search. Therefore, the amendment is not entered (see MPEP 714.20).

Continuation of 11, does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

On page 9 filed 5/12/2010, Applicant argues with respect to claim 84, that Fig. 1 provides written description support under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. In particular, Applicant notes the bi-directional arrows and the phrase "results returned." However, the issue does not regard a written description of "results returned." Applicant fails to address the basis of the rejection which is that there does not appear to be a description of the remote server (i.e. "code generator 104") returning the output of the decision service (i.e. "decision server 109") to the client server (ii.e. "web server 111"). The rejection of claim 84 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph is maintained.

In regard to the rejection of claim 104 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, Applicant points to p. 21, line 12, p. 22, lines 15-16, and Figs. 15-17 for additional support. However, none of these citations provide any written description to make in 104. It is noted that none of these cited portions even mention a "decision tree," much less a description of the extensive utilization of such "decision tree" found in claim 104. The relection is maintained.

The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, are maintained since the claim amendments have not been entered. On pages 11-12, Applicant argues that interpretation of the claimed floacions energi "is overly broad, and that "business rules in a business layer" cannot read on the claims in view of the specification. Applicant is correct in suggesting that claims must be interpreted in light of the specification. However, reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from "reading limitations of the specification into a claim", to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim. It is not clear what characteristics Applicant is suggesting such a "decision serve" to have. Prior at of record Courts (U.S 6055220) discloses business rules to assist in making complicated decisions" (see column 3 lines 49-53). It is not clear why a server that assists in making decisions cannot be regarded as a "decision server." The refections are maintained.

In the middle of page 12, Applicant notes the citation of Courts col. 8 lines 18-41. Presumably, this is in reference to the rejection of claim 84 on page 9 of the 3/12/2010 Office action. This particular section introduces an obviousness analysis of Courts, which is subsequently followed by the additional teaching of Mears (US 604/1362) which further teaches remote and client servers. Again, it is not clear which characteristics are intended to be covered such that an interpretation of remote and client servers cannot be interpreted according to a reading of remote and client servers, at least as taunth by Mears, let alone Courts. The rejection is maintained.

At the bottom of page 12, Applicant essentially argues that Courts and APAA does not teach all the limitations of claim 104. However, the rejection is based upon a combination of references including prior at of record Mears, and not Courts and APAA alone. For at least this reason, Applicant's argument is not persuasive. The references combine to teach an obvious arrangement of data exchange and disolav.

In response to applicant's argument on page 13, that the examiner has combined an excessive number of references, reliance on a large number of references in a rejection does not, without more, weigh against the obviousness of the claimed invention. See In re Gorman, 933 F.2 d 982. 18 USPO2d 1885 [Fed. Cir. 1991].

In response to applicant's argument that Courts, Mears, Cluts, Meltzer, Traversant and Ho are nonanalogous art, it has been held that a prior art reference must either be in the field of applicant's endeavor or, if not, then be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the applicant was concerned, in order to be relied upon as a basis for rejection of the claimed invention. See he ne Oetiker, 977 F.26 1443, 24 USPQ26 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, Applicant appears to acknowledge that each of references at least "skirt around the claimed subject matter" (see top of page 14 filed 5/12/2010). As such, the references are considered to be at least "reasonably pertinent" to the problems at his problems at his